International democracy assistance to emerging democracies has grown steadily from the late 1980s to over US$5 billion annually. Electoral assistance and support for civil society are well-documented features. Help with legislative strengthening and building stronger political parties and competitive party systems is more modest and has received less attention. However many countries have been the object of one or both types of support.
approaches, 2 one of which recommends closer involvement with efforts to strengthen political parties and party systems.
This article does not offer a comprehensive survey of legislative strengthening: timely reviews of varying scope are readily accessible elsewhere (for example Hudson and Wren 2007; Wehner et al. 2009 ). Rather it focuses more particularly on the recommendation in reports and inquiries into support for legislative strengthening for closer cooperation with assistance to party strengthening. The case for investigating this recommendation is underlined by Power's (2008: 23) observation that parliamentary and party support have in fact been 'entirely separate disciplines in terms of analysis, evaluation, and practice'. If the reasons for this state of affairs can be identified then the chances that the recommendations will be implemented successfully can be assessed more accurately. To do this, however, the issue must be introduced, first, within a broader account of organisations involved in international democracy support and the sort of activities that legislative and party strengthening involve. A second section sets out arguments in favour of the recommendation; the third section raises counter-arguments. These suggest that expectations should be moderate. The fourth section argues that different ways of approaching legislative strengthening may gain more traction. But these are geared more to promoting good governance for the purpose of promoting development than democratisation goals sought by party aid and legislative strengtheners in the democracy assistance industry.
A conclusion summarises the main points.
INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING AND PARTY SUPPORT
International democracy assistance conventionally refers to consensual and grant aided support for activities designed to help countries move in the direction of establishing and consolidating western style liberal democracy. The borderline between this and support for improving governance is blurry; good governance and democratisation are two policy agendas that often seem inextricably linked, as in the term democratic governance. But while not mutually exclusive their respective emphases are different. For instance tackling corruption (the use of public office for private gain) and its roots feature prominently in efforts to improve accountable governance, but while relevant to judging democratic performance it is less central in theories of democracy and democratisation, where ideas of participation, contestation and opportunities for the people to make political choices are fundamental. The largest organisations like USAID are involved in a wide range of activities associated with all main sectors and sub-sectors of what Carothers (1999: 88) However, notwithstanding all the above, the fact that nearly ten years ago USAID (2000: 63) called the role of parties in legislatures not just an 'emerging issue' for legislative strengthening but one 'where progress can be expected to proceed only slowly', and that nine years on fresh calls for this to happen are on the increase, tel us the path will not be easy. Before the obstacles are identified, however, the next section first draws out arguments in favour of the recommendation.
SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
The case for a closer relationship depends to some extent on the precise nature of the recommendation. Usually this is left unclear. Different terms like greater coordination, cooperation, and integration are used but not defined in any detail: the full implications for projects or programmes and no less important for organisational arrangements both between and inside the relevant institutional actors are not spelled out. There is a considerable difference between sharing experiences, which to some extent already happens, and the systematic integration of assistance intervention strategies in advance. Nevertheless, three supporting arguments that appear to underlie the recommendations can be teased out below. First, while at one level legislative strengthening and party support are both committed to advancing the cause of democratic governance current evidence points to some shared limitations. This prompts an inference that joining forces in some way will make it easier for the weaknesses to be overcome (see Power 2008).
Perhaps the most salient shared characteristic here is that parliamentary and party assistance are generally judged to be the most politically sensitive areas of international democracy assistance. This may explain why they have been less favoured than other forms such as capacity building in civil society, although that too can attract political complications. However the sensitivities are not all identical.
External involvement with a country's legislature -the supreme law-making bodytouches directly on issues of national sovereignty; involvement with parties carries risks of being construed by the government in partisan terms, even when support is offered on a multiparty basis. Partisanship is inescapable where international donors shun parties whose democratic credentials are weak or have unacceptably racist, tribal, sexist or xenophobic agendas.
That said, in some countries in Africa for instance even parliamentary strengthening is said to run 'the risk of being identified with short-term partisan political agendas' (AAPPG 2008: 45) . Governments may interpret even these efforts as a direct challenge, in one party dominant states for instance. However, clearly this is different from suspicions arising from local concern about the underlying policy intentions of external actors, which in the case of foreign aid donors, the Bretton Woods
Institutions particularly, may be bound up with their advice on the kind of neo-liberal macro-economic measures and public expenditure control that donors believe vital to development. Here parliamentarians across all parties may have common anxieties about external imposition, if not objecting also to the actual policy substance; opposition party politicians, denied the increased patronage that aid brings to the government side, have grounds for being even more antipathetic than government supporters. The growing interest that some aid donors now evince in strengthening legislatures for the purpose of advancing the national commitment to pro-poor development broadens the policy agenda, but far from bringing the age of foreign aid conditionality to an end it can be viewed as adding yet a further new twist.
Second and moving beyond simple observations that legislative and party support invite strong politicisation, there is an underlying albeit barely articulated rationale for combining efforts stemming from the idea that the state of parliaments and the condition of the parties are mutually interdependent, almost everywhere. A weak legislature that has limited formal powers is bad for the political parties, whether the system is presidential, parliamentary or hybrid. In legislatures overawed by executive domination opposition parties may wither between elections, especially where floorcrossing is allowed. The chances of establishing a competitive party system are reduced accordingly. The scenario can then become self-perpetuating: weak parties or a dominant party system undermine the capability of the legislature and its chance of enjoying real autonomy. Putting increased resources at the disposal of parliament and training exercises may do little to change the situation. Lack of public trust in the parties and their viability will reflect badly on confidence in the legislature.
Conversely, a legislature that looks badly organised or remote from the people damages public perceptions of political parties and politicians -actors who tend to be among the least trusted of all public institutions, according to successive opinion surveys in many new democracies.
The upshot then is that improvements to the legislature and to the parties can go hand in hand: there is a synergy. After all, the same type of actor -and the same individuals even (MPs) -define the membership of legislatures and sit at the top of the pyramid of political party organisation. This distinguishes the potential nexus between much legislative and party work from other combinations of support to democratic governance that involve very different partners and stakeholders, ranging from professional bureaucrats to civil society leaders. And yet not all the benefits to parties and legislatures from a more joined-up approach to support can be expected to occur simultaneously; some sequencing is inevitable, especially where reform programmes must be implemented gradually and the indirect effects take time to materialise. These considerations should inform how recommendations for a closer relationship are put into operation, to avoid disappointment later. And more thought could be given to why one of the world's most powerful legislatures, the US Congress, can coexist with parties that look very weak by West European standards, in contrast to Britain, where historically parties have been strong but parliament has been criticised for being weak vis-à-vis the executive (Weir and Beetham 1999) .
Third, there is the recommendation found in some reports on legislative strengthening that more effort should be given to raising the demand for parliamentary reform from the countries themselves, contrary to a supply-drive approach (see for example Hudson and Wren 2007: 48 
GROUNDS FOR CAUTION
The recommendations urging a closer relationship of legislative strengthening and party support naturally do not outline arguments against. But grounds for being cautious about the merits and sceptical that successful measures to implement the recommendations will emerge soon merit discussion. Five broad points will be made here. Finally, a remark often heard from democracy assistance practitioners is that their approach must always retain the facility to be flexible and seize on opportunities, which can arise unexpectedly. Projects and programmes may have to be refashioned in mid-term in response to changing political circumstances. Also, in hostile environments like Belarus useful party work has to be covert or confidential. These properties are more difficult to accommodate within a coordinated regime that requires a strong measure of forward planning, detailed allocation of tasks and bureaucratic organisation.
Limitations of the arguments

Tensions among objectives
More coherent than across-the-board recommendations, then, a selective approach to combining legislative and party support activities must acknowledge that possibilities exist for tensions as well as synergies. Indeed, where an illiberal civilian government's reluctance to embrace greater democracy or the democratic shortcomings of the party in power make all-party support unappealing to international actors, suggestions that party and legislative support should be combined are unlikely to gain much headway. If ownership by the government is made a requirement then the government has a veto power that could prove stifling. Support focussed just on opposition parties, if feasible, could be a more promising option, or, as in Zimbabwe where such support prompted government aggression against the opposition, assistance to the legislature independently is more attractive..
Irrespective of which approach to party support best serves to promote the objective of competitive party politics, that systemic objective does not always sit easily with a central feature of effective parliamentary oversight of the executive that makes willingness to set aside party differences, and adopt a common purpose, essential.
Also, in societies emerging from violent conflict actors like UNDP look to parliament as a place where inclusive dialogue and leadership in national reunification must set examples to the people, rather than encourage the spirit of adversarial or highly confrontational politics. Where MPs face an awkward balancing act between pursuing one kind of politics in the assembly with a different, more robust contestation in the country, weaving a single 'holistic' package of external support for both legislature and parties combining all objectives will be difficult. However this does not mean the different objectives cannot be served separately: the NIMD's distinctive approach to engaging in cross-party work for example appears to have enjoyed some success.
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However, where relations between parties in parliament are as bad as they are claimed in Lebanon it seems that the UNDP's parliamentary programme there should concentrate on working with parliamentary officers, while efforts to assist the parties must take place somewhere else, outside the country even (Murphy and Alhada 2007: 40) .
Hard-to-reach independent variables
Important factors that have influenced the effectiveness of legislative or party support and seem impervious to influence by either activity operating in isolation would continue to be hard to affect even by the two activities working in close combination.
One such is the overall resource constraint. There are few grounds for thinking that additional funding will be made available and earmarked for combined initiatives. A major rationale offered for the issue approach is that it could circumvent some of the political sensitivities bedevilling party aid and direct approaches to strengthening legislatures as well, particularly on the government side. It is less threatening.
Plausibly political parties too have much to gain from improving MPs' grasp of policy but only if their increase in understanding can be institutionalised in the party structures somehow. A bonus for legislatures would be where greater attention to policy issues leads parliamentarians to give more weight to holding government accountable for policy implementation, subverting the ties of neo-patrimonial and clientelistic politics that bind them to the executive. There may also be an unspoken expectation that extra resources will be brought to legislative strengthening from the consierable funds that key development policy initiatives receive from international aid and the 'good governance' programmes attached to this end.
However, the balance of advantages that an issue-based approach could mean for political parties and even for legislatures, and for democratisation, is definitely mixed.
The resistance at a conceptual and bureaucratic level to the idea of reprogramming legislative strengthening activities to support economic development activities, that has been reported at USAID (2006) for example, hints at some possible objections.
Three can be cited here.
First, the idea is not suitable for every country. Just as some countries need development assistance but are not viewed as priorities for democracy assistance (because they already are democracies, or because the priorities of state-building or reconstruction must come first), or international democracy support is not welcome, so there are countries where weak legislature (and parties) could benefit from international engagement but have no need of development aid -oil-exporting rentier states in the Gulf, for instance.
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Second, when combining sectoral assistance defined in terms of a particular aspect of the political process or political institutions -as in legislative and party strengthening -with issue-based support related to development programmes there is the possibility that the latter will come to dominate the agenda (Hubli and Schmidt 2007: 25) .
Governments with weak democratic inclinations whose legitimacy and popularity rest heavily on policy performance can be expected to encourage just such a scenario.
Finding ways to evaluate international interventions that aim at a mixture of substantive policy outputs and changes in political process or institutions poses a formidable challenge: the former, being easier to design, more readily quantifiable and, very possibly, more susceptible to demonstrating tangible results quickly may influence the decision-making disproportionately: these qualities count with decisionmakers responsible for allocating resources among competing claims.
Third, an issue based approach to legislative strengthening tempts the international providers both of democracy aid and, more especially, governance assistance for development, to expand support to civil society organisations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). This already forms a distinctive growing feature of donor involvement. Not only is civil society capacity-building a well established sectoral approach to supporting democratisation but steps to involve civil society in approaches to improving governance are becoming popular with aid donors too: it can be seen as the other side of the coin of low confidence in the politicians.
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Organisations for development ranging from the World Bank to DFID increasingly look to CSOs not just to lobby parliamentarians but to take up policy demands and grievances directly with government ('societal accountability') and, even, engage directly with such institutions of horizontal accountability as the courts, ombudsman, national audit office and anti-corruption commission ('diagonal accountability').
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DFID's small Governance and Transparency fund, established in 2007, is a modest example. Much encouragement is being aimed at making governments more accountable for the way they spend public money -and hence the way that foreign is used -and to ensure development strategies of the kind that international donors prefer have more solid backing from society. But are the consequences for legislative strengthening aimed at building democracy necessarily beneficial?
Civil society, development and democratisation
Until recently parliaments as well as parties were marginalised in the efforts made by aid donors to leverage improvements in financial management by governments and shape their policies towards development. Since the introduction of poverty reduction strategies from the late 1990s civil society leaders in aid-dependent countries routinely discuss with the Ministry of Finance and international donors this aspect of public policy. However, as often as not parliaments continued to be presented with a fait accompli. A review for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2005) found that poverty strategies were formally presented to parliament in only a third of the countries. That some modest attention is now focussing on grounds for strengthening the connections between civil society and parliaments and other state institutions may prove good for development. But if the corollary means that political parties are left far behind then the overall benefit to democratisation begins to look less secure.
Expressions of concern about where such developments might lead have circulated informally in discussions about party strengthening in democracy assistance for some time; a recent, perhaps even more worrying twist is suggested by the reported grievance of MPs in Malawi that external support to CSOs is 'setting civil society and parliament against one another ' (AAPPG 2008: 35) . 32 Possibly more alarming still is yet another observer's claim that the success of civil society's growing involvement in government activities such as budget decision-making, through initiatives like participative budgeting, may actually 'depend on a weak legislature or undermine the power of the legislature' -because governments require 'space to innovate' without waiting on the legislature's consent (Krafchik 2005: 9 ). The final outcome, then, may include neither a vibrant party system nor a particularly strong legislature; and stronger, mutually supportive relations between the two could be even more remote.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
International interest in legislative strengthening is on the increase. There is a consensus that efforts could achieve better results. The learning curve up to now has included the idea that more effort should be put into working with parliamentarians 
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Of course there could be other issues like the environment or gender equity where policy support from outside is appropriate and might be welcome.
27
. AAPPG (2008: 18) says that in donor eyes 'parliament is often seen more as a part of the problem than part of the solution'.
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In Africa for instance while support for social accountability is said to be in its infancy the demand is judged to be high (McNeil and Mumvuma 2006 Barkan (2007) for a useful contribution.
